ederal welfare policy changed fundamentally with the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996. Policy decision making was shifted to the state and even county level, which gave rise to the adoption of a myriad of different policies across the nation. However, in almost every locale, emphasis was placed squarely on families becoming self-sufficient through employment.
easily than when one examines outcomes that change more slowly, such as completed years of education or cognitive development. The specific reforms that are expected to affect breast-feeding are those that have an impact on mothers with infants. Our study quantified the specific policies-work requirements for mothers with six month olds and sanctions for not satisfying these requirements-and estimated their impact.
There is reason to suspect that welfare reforms could be causing a reduction in breast-feeding. Previous research found a positive causal impact of welfare reforms on employment and a negative correlation between employment and breast-feeding. If such employment effects exist among mothers with infants, then welfare reform could be causing some new mothers to enter the workforce and, in turn, to stop breast-feeding.
Our basic identification strategy relied on comparing the change in breast-feeding in states that adopted stringent work policies with that in states that adopted lenient policies. Relying on national data for 1990-2000, we found that work requirements reduced breastfeeding substantially. Our preferred estimates imply that the most stringent work requirements cause the breast-feeding rate six months after birth to decline 3.1 percentage points (22%) for new mothers who are enrolled in the Special Supplemental Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) and 2.1 percentage points (9%) for all new mothers. These results imply that if the nation had not adopted the reforms that were implemented in 1996 and subsequent years, the national breast-feeding rate would have been 5.5% higher than it actually was in 2000. Such negative impacts of particular policies (full-family sanctions, coupled with moderate-to-high hours-of-work requirements) must be weighed against potential benefits as states develop and refine their overall welfare programs.
BACKGROUND

Literature on Breast-feeding
Numerous studies have concluded that human milk is the gold standard for infants' nourishment (for useful reviews, see American Academy of Pediatrics 1997 and Lawrence 2000) . For example, studies have found that human milk is associated with lower rates of urinary-tract infections, lower and upper respiratory-tract infections, diarrhea, allergic diseases, otitis media, bacterial meningitis, botulism, bacteremia, and necrotizing enterocolitis for infants and children (e.g., Beaudry, Dufour, and Marcoux 1995; Duncan et al. 1993) . In addition to the physiological health benefits, human milk also benefits children's cognitive and educational abilities (e.g., Horwood and Fergusson 1998; Lucas et al. 1992) .
Studies have also suggested that breast-feeding is beneficial for mothers' health (for a useful review, see Labbok 2001) . The list of beneficial health outcomes includes a lower risk of breast and ovarian cancers, decreased incidence of long-term osteoporosis and pregnancy-induced obesity, more rapid return to the prepartum state, and reduced menstrual blood loss (e.g., McTiernan and Thomas 1986 ). In addition, there is some evidence of a greater sense of self-esteem, bonding with the infant, and success with mothering (e.g., Locklin and Naber 1993) .
Given that the benefits of breast-feeding are well established, barriers to breastfeeding have clinical and policy significance. One potential barrier is maternal employment. Research has documented a negative correlation between full-time maternal employment and the duration of breast-feeding (for a useful review, see Lindberg 1996a) . Results are mixed on how part-time employment affects rates of breast-feeding compared with not working, with some studies finding (Lindberg 1996b) and others not finding a significant difference (Fein and Roe 1998) .
Literature on Welfare Reform
The 1996 federal welfare legislation PRWORA, which replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), changed welfare policy in two important respects: it increased the emphasis on work and gave states greater discretion in designing their programs. Some policies that states enacted are lifetime limits for welfare receipt, higher earnings disregards, family caps, and work-participation requirements (Rowe 2000) .
There have been numerous experimental studies of welfare-to-work programs (for useful reviews, see Grogger, Karoly, and Klerman 2002 and Hamilton et al. 2001) . These studies have generally found that welfare-to-work programs modestly increase the supply of labor, particularly when the policies are coupled with some type of enforcement mechanism. In addition to the employment effects, these studies have found that the programs do not lead to higher total family income because the increased earnings are offset by reductions in welfare transfer income. Furthermore, they have found little impact on children's well-being.
Although these experimental studies have provided important evidence on the likely impacts of welfare reform, they have suffered from at least one significant drawback: most experimental designs include only individuals who initially participated in welfare and therefore are not informative regarding individuals who did not enroll in welfare because of the reforms. Grogger, Haider, and Klerman (2003) concluded that reductions in entry accounted for roughly half the decline in welfare caseloads in the 1990s, implying that the experimental studies could have substantially misstated the impact of the reforms.
In addition to the experimental evidence, several studies that have used observational data have attempted to identify the causal impacts of the various welfare policies. These studies have usually focused on the welfare caseload (e.g., CEA 1997 CEA , 1999 Grogger forthcoming; Ziliak et al. 2000) . Such studies cannot provide information on whether potential recipients are made better off by the reforms. A few such studies have focused on employment, income, poverty, and family structure (e.g., Bitler, Gelbach, and Hoynes 2002; Ellwood 2000; Grogger forthcoming; Moffitt 1999; Schoeni and Blank 2000) . Consistent with the experimental evidence, these studies have tended to conclude that welfare reform contributed to the rise in employment among low-income mothers (Grogger forthcoming; Meyer and Rosenbaum 2001; Moffitt 1999; O'Neill and Hill 2001; Schoeni and Blank 2000) .
A Simple Conceptual Framework
A new mother will decide when to stop breast-feeding (and whether to initiate breastfeeding) by evaluating its underlying costs and benefits. This decision is made continually over time as new information and constraints arise. Employment may increase the cost of choosing to rely on breast milk, depending on a mother's flexibility to breast-feed or pump during the workday and a mother's access to pump and cooler technology (HillsBonczyk et al. 1993 ). When the breast-feeding costs associated with work are sufficiently high, then policies that increase the labor supply of mothers will have an adverse impact on the prevalence of breast-feeding. However, it is not clear that mandated work would increase the cost sufficiently to cause a woman to stop breast-feeding, nor is it clear that the women who are directly affected by welfare-to-work laws would have breast-fed in the absence of the law. Moreover, the change in labor-force attachment induced by welfare policies may increase total income, which, in turn, may increase breast-feeding, all else being equal. The goal of our empirical analysis was to estimate the net effect of the policy changes on breast-feeding.
Few states require mothers to work within the first few weeks after birth; therefore, any impact on breast-feeding in the hospital (which we could measure in our data) can be interpreted as an anticipatory effect. Specifically, mothers may decide not to breast-feed in the hospital because they expect that the work requirements they will face a few months after birth will cause them to enter the workforce and, in turn, to stop breast-feeding. This anticipatory effect will tend to be small if the costs of learning to breast-feed are small or if the perceived benefits of breast-feeding are relatively high within the first few months after birth.
Given previous research, we expected that the anticipatory effects would be small. Ryan (2000) found nearly identical breast-feeding rates in the hospital for women who were employed and not employed (67.7% for those who were employed vs. 68.0% for those who were not employed), but the rates diverged at 6 months (26.6 vs. 35.4%) and at 12 months (13.6 vs. 22.0%). In addition, previous research suggested that the benefits of breast-feeding are the highest within the first few months after birth (see American Academy of Pediatrics 1997).
THE DATA
To examine the impact of changing welfare laws on breast-feeding, we needed data on breast-feeding that would enable us to examine state-by-state variation over the 1990s, when welfare policies were changing rapidly across the states. Aggregate data on breastfeeding from the Ross Laboratories Mothers Survey (RLMS) were the only suitable data that were publicly available. Breast-feeding Rates RLMS, a proprietary survey of Ross Laboratories, is a large, national mail survey conducted since 1955 to determine patterns of milk feeding from birth to age 12 months. Mothers are asked to recall the type of milk their babies were fed in the hospital, at week 1 of age, in the previous 30 days, and in the past week. 4 Questionnaires are mailed to a probability sample of new mothers who are selected from a list of names that represent approximately 80%-85% of all national births; the list includes names from hospital sources, county records of birth registrations, photography and diaper services, and newspapers. The samples are large, with 420,000, 720,000, and 1.4 million questionnaires mailed in 1991, 1992, and 2000, respectively. Such large sample sizes allow relatively precise state-by-state estimates in each year. See Ryan (1997 Ryan ( , 2000 for additional information on the RLMS.
Despite the incomplete coverage of the RLMS and a low response rate that is common among mail surveys (approximately 45% over the period of interest), its national estimates of the prevalence of breast-feeding are similar to those produced using several other well-known national surveys, including the National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG) and the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) III (Hediger et al. 2001; Ryan et al. 1991) . Moreover, national trends in breast-feeding (from 1955 to 1987) and differences across sociodemographic characteristics are similar in the RLMS and the NSFG (Ryan et al. 1991) .
Although the underlying RLMS microdata are proprietary and are not made available to researchers outside Ross Laboratories, annual estimates of four different breast-feeding rates for each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia are published (Ryan 2000) . These four rates are for all new mothers in the hospital just after they gave birth, all mothers six months later, WIC mothers in the hospital just after they gave birth, and WIC mothers six months later. In these data, a WIC mother is defined as any new mother who 3. The RLMS data are used by the National Institute of Health to monitor the Healthy People 2010 objective to increase U.S. national breast-feeding rates. See Grummer-Strawn and Li (2000) for a review of the available data on breast-feeding.
4. Starting in 1997, Ross Laboratories mailed its survey to mothers with infants aged 1 month, 2 months, 3 months, and so forth, up to age 12 months. In earlier years, surveys were mailed to mothers when their infants were aged 6 or 12 months. Respondents were asked to recall the type of milk fed to their infants immediately after birth, in the hospital, and during each of the first 12 months of life. The one complication that this change in design has caused is that sample sizes are smaller in later years, implying that the aggregate data are heteroskedastic over time.
received WIC for herself or her infant at any time after the birth of the child, including the six-week postpartum period of benefits granted to pregnant WIC recipients. We used these data for 1990-2000 as the outcomes in our analysis. Table 1 presents national estimates of the four different breast-feeding rates by year on the basis of the RLMS aggregate data. Two important patterns emerge from the estimates in Table 1 . First, there was a secular increase in breast-feeding in the United States for all new mothers and for WIC mothers. The increase, which occurred both in the hospital and six months after birth, corresponds with the growing belief that breast milk is the optimal source of nutrition for infants. Second, the prevalence of breast-feeding six months after birth is substantially less than the prevalence in the hospital. Thus, many women who begin breast-feeding do not continue to breast-feed for the 6-12 months recommended by the American Academy of Pediatrics (1997).
Welfare Policies
Because of the numerous policy changes that were enacted as part of welfare reform and the significant variation in policies across the states, it is difficult to develop a parsimonious yet meaningful classification of state policies. For our purposes, we classified states according to their policies that directly relate to the work requirements for mothers of sixmonth-old infants (corresponding to the RLMS data on breast-feeding). We constructed this classification on the basis of three work policies: (1) whether any work is required for mothers of six-month-old infants, (2) the minimum number of hours of work that are required, and (3) sanctions.
Our primary source for information on welfare policies was the Urban Institute's (2001) Welfare Rules Database (WRD); see Rowe (2000) for a useful summary of the WRD. We supplemented these data with information on sanction policies from the CEA (1999). In addition, when information on hours requirements was not available in the WRD, either because it was missing or states determined hours requirements on a caseby-case basis, we used data on hours requirements from the State Policy Documentation Project (SPDP 2000) . The SPDP database contains information on the actual implementation of hours requirements.
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The first policy component that we considered is whether there are any work requirements for a mother with a six-month-old infant. Before TANF, some states had instituted work requirements, but all states exempted mothers with a child under age 36 months. PRWORA mandated that all states adopt work requirements for its general welfare population but allowed states latitude in exempting mothers of young children from these work requirements. By 2000, young-child exemptions ranged from 0 to 48 months across the 50 states and the District of Columbia, with approximately 60% of the states having an exemption of more than six months. However, even the states that allow young-child exemptions often place restrictions on its use, such as a limit on the number of months it is applicable or on which mothers can use them.
6 Based on these exemptions, we categorize states as either not requiring work from a mother with a six-month-old infant or requiring at least some work from a mother of a six-month-old infant.
7
Previous research, cited earlier, suggested that breast-feeding declines substantially only when women work full time. Therefore, the second dimension of welfare policy is the minimum number of hours a state requires a new mother to work. In 2000, 43 states and the District of Columbia required single-parent welfare participants to work a minimum number of hours per week. We categorized states into three exhaustive categories: no hour requirements (0), moderate hour requirements (18-30), and high hour requirements (32 or more). No states had requirements of 1-17 or 31 hours.
The third component is the sanction policy a state adopted. Sanction policy refers to the penalties that are imposed on families who do not meet the work requirements. "Fullfamily" sanctions withhold the entire family's cash assistance, whereas "partial-family" sanctions withhold only a portion of the family's benefits. Some states impose sanctions after the first offense, whereas others do so only after repeated offenses. We examined sanction policies because they indicate the consequences that a woman would face if she did not meet the specified work requirements. Experimental evidence has suggested that a stringent work requirement policy will have less of an impact when there are few consequences to violating the policy (Hamilton et al. 2001) . We classified states as having "sanctions" if they impose a full-family sanction for the first or later violations; otherwise, states were classified as having "no sanctions."
On the basis of these three work policies, we classified states into eight categories.
8 Table 2 summarizes the policy categories, and Table 3 presents the variation in policies across time (detailed information on each state's policies is available from the authors on request). A state with a given policy in place for more than half the calendar year was 5. In results not reported here, we reestimated all the models presented in this article using the SPDP data for hours-of-work requirements, and the results did not change quantitatively. For example, we report in a later section that the breast-feeding rate would have been 5.5% higher if it were not for welfare reform. Relying on the SPDP hours data instead of the WRD hours data, we found that the comparable figure is 5.6%.
6. For example, several states do not allow exemptions to apply to "capped" children (i.e., children who were born or conceived while their mothers were already on welfare). In addition, some states based exemption criteria on the mother's characteristics (e.g., age and education). See Rowe (2000) and the WRD.
7. Given this classification, it is possible that a sufficiently long exemption for new welfare entrants could keep a mother with a young child from having to work, even if there was no young-child work exemption in the state. However, no state has implemented a long initial exemption in conjunction with a short child exemption; thus, such concerns are not empirically relevant.
8. We attempted to separate states that would always require a mother to work versus those that sometimes require a mother to work. The results (not reported here) proved to be noisy, which is not surprising given that we had 14 policy categories rather than the current 8 policy categories. coded as having a policy indicator equal to 1; otherwise the policy indicator variable was coded as 0.
Turning to Table 3 , none of the states required work for young mothers or had sanction policies in the early 1990s. A few states adopted sanction policies as a waiver during 1994-1996, and these states were categorized as "no work/-/sanctions." States did not begin to adopt work requirements for mothers with infants until 1996.
Although our primary interest is the effects of welfare work requirements, we also included two other measures of welfare generosity: the maximum level of cash assistance for a family of three and whether a lifetime termination time limit was in effect. These data were taken from CEA (1999) and updated through 2000 using the WRD.
Other Data
Two significant laws affecting breast-feeding were passed in some states during the 1990s (Baldwin and Friedman 2001) . The first law reinforces that mothers are permitted to breast-feed in public areas, and the second law attempts to accommodate breast-feeding in the workplace. The stipulations of the workplace law vary among the states, from acknowledging the importance of employers to allow their employees to breast-feed at work to requiring employers to allow mothers to breast-feed at work and make appropriate accommodations for them. We relied on two indicator variables to capture the existence of these two laws, with the respective indicator taking the value of 1 if the policy was in effect in the state in a given year and 0 otherwise. The prevalence of these laws across years is presented in Table 3 .
We used the state unemployment rate from the Bureau of Labor Statistics to measure local labor-market opportunities. The number of live births by state and year, which was used as weights in the regression analysis, was taken from the National Center for Health Statistics' (2002) National Vital Statistics Reports. .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 1.00 .07 .00 1991 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 1.00 .07 .00 1992 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 1.00 .07 .00 1993 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 1.00 .14 .00 1994 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 . Note: See Table 2 for further details regarding the welfare-policy categorizations.
ANALYTICAL APPROACH
To identify the impact of the changes in welfare law on breast-feeding, we relied on a "difference-in-difference" strategy in which we exploited both the time and state variation in the data. Specifically, we compared the change in breast-feeding rates in states that adopted the various combinations of policies. This strategy flexibly controlled for any initial differences and common time trend in breast-feeding across all states, while allowing us to focus on the direct impact of changes in work requirements.
Graphical Analysis
To demonstrate our basic analytic strategy, we classified states by their 2000 policy category and then pooled the 28 states that were in the two relatively stringent policy categories ("work/high hours/sanctions" and "work/moderate hours/sanctions") and the five states that were in the two relatively weak policy categories ("no work/-/no sanctions" and "no work/-/sanctions"). For these pooled policy categories, we computed the prevalence of breast-feeding for WIC mothers in the years before and after the implementation of the states' policies. For example, we obtained the prevalence in breast-feeding for each of the two groups in each of the years before the law was passed (denoted as years -3, -2, and -1), the year the law was changed (denoted as year 0), and the years after the law was passed (denoted as years +1, +2, and +3).
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Figures 1 and 2 present the prevalence of breast-feeding in the hospital and six months after birth, respectively. As can be observed in Figure 1 , there were distinct differences between the two groups of states in their initial prevalence of breast-feeding in the hospital, but both sets of states exhibited the same general time trend. The absolute gap between the two groups remained approximately constant at 16 to 17 percentage points. A difference-in-difference strategy compares the differences in the later years to the differences in the early years to obtain an estimate of the impact of the policies. Such a comparison implies that welfare policies had little impact on breast-feeding in the hospital, which is consistent with there being no anticipatory effects.
The results for breast-feeding at six months (see Figure 2) were much different. The states that had adopted a stringent work policy did not experience the increase in breastfeeding that was enjoyed by those states that did not adopt a stringent policy. A difference-in-difference estimate would suggest that the policy caused the gap to grow by roughly 3 percentage points (i.e., evaluated at the average of the three years before versus after reform).
Regression Analysis
We extended this basic difference-in-difference approach using a regression analysis. The extension allowed us to include other time-varying factors that may have influenced the breast-feeding rate and to pool the various years and policy choices across the states.
Specifically, consider the following regression model:
9. The three states that remained in the "no work/-/no sanctions" category do not have a date of implementation because their policy did not change during the period. For these states, a "date of implementation" was assigned by randomly selecting (with equal probability) 1 of the 28 states in the "stringent policy" category to provide an implementation date. In addition, 1 of the states in the stringent policy category (Wisconsin) adopted its policy in 1998, and thus the prevalence of breast-feeding three years after the policy was not observed in our data; we simply computed the prevalence among the observed states for this entry. When we produced the same figure (not shown here) but excluded Wisconsin from every year, the figure was essentially unchanged.
The dependent variable Y st is the proportion of new mothers who breast-feed in state s in year t, and Policy st is a vector of the seven policy indicators described in Table 2 , with the "no work/-/no sanctions" category the excluded group. It is important to note that the basic model also includes state and year fixed effects to mimic the difference-indifference approach described with the graphical analysis. The state fixed effects (γ s ) control for factors that are largely fixed within a state over time, such as the racial/ethnic, education, and income distributions of a state. The year fixed effects (λ t ) capture the effects of factors that are common across all the states but change over time, such as information on the benefits of breast-feeding. Thus, the coefficient β 1 represents the difference in the breast-feeding rate for mothers who live in states that implemented the given policies relative to mothers who live in states that retained the "no work/-/no sanctions" category. Implicitly, this formulation measures the mean impact of the policy change during the years following the change.
We estimated the basic model both with and without a series of controls (X st ) to capture other factors that could potentially confound the results. Two of the control variables captured other aspects of welfare policy: an indicator coded 1 in states/years that a lifetime termination time limit was in effect and the log of the maximum cash benefit for a family of three. The inclusion of these factors was intended to capture the general character of welfare policy in a state and thus to ensure that the work-requirement variables Table  2 . Stringent-work-requirement states are states whose 2000 policy places them in either the "work/high hours/sanctions" or the "work/moderate hours/sanctions" category.
were actually capturing the effects of the work-requirement policies. We also included two indicator variables for whether the two major breast-feeding laws were in effect in the state in the given year. Finally, we included the state unemployment rate to capture cyclical changes in economic opportunities that may have affected employment and, in turn, breast-feeding.
We conducted the analysis on two populations: all new mothers and new mothers who participated in WIC. We present the results for all new mothers because they provide population-level estimates that are useful in assessing the total impact of the welfare law changes. Because many new mothers might not have been affected by welfare policies, such estimates could hide large impacts on certain subgroups. Therefore, we also present the results for new mothers who participated in WIC. WIC participants are a useful subpopulation that may have been particularly affected by TANF policies because they are almost all low-income families. New WIC mothers must meet income and nutritional-risk requirements to be eligible. The income threshold for WIC is 185% of the poverty line, and throughout the 1990s, all AFDC/TANF recipients were income-eligible for WIC. Table  2 . Stringent-work-requirement states are states whose 2000 policy places them in either the "work/high hours/sanctions" or the "work/moderate hours/sanctions" category. 10. An exception to the 185% cutoff is that Medicaid recipients are adjunctively eligible for WIC, and some states have Medicaid cutoffs that are above 185% of the poverty line.
influenced by AFDC and TANF program rules. A second motivation for studying the WIC population is much more practical: the prevalence of breast-feeding by the WIC population is the only other aggregate tabulation available from the RLMS.
There is one potential drawback to focusing on WIC participants as a study population. WIC participation is a choice, and changes in who chooses to participate in WIC could potentially confound these results.
11 For example, if states that adopted relatively stringent work requirements also changed their WIC policies in a manner that affected who chose to participate in WIC, then we would mistakenly attribute the change in who chose to participate in WIC to being a welfare-policy effect on breast-feeding. However, we believe that such concerns are relatively minor. First, as was observed in the graphical analysis, a comparison of in-hospital breast-feeding rates between the two groups of states suggests that the states experienced the same underlying trends. Second, we compared the results for WIC mothers to all mothers as a further empirical check of whether the WIC results are driven by changes in participation; these comparisons (reported in the next section) suggest that changes in participation did not drive our results.
We note three final aspects about our regression analysis. First, we examined the impact of welfare reform on breast-feeding at two points after birth: in the hospital and when the infant was six months old. Again, on the basis of previous research and the graphical analysis, we expected to find little effect of the policies on breast-feeding in the hospital, indicating that anticipatory responses to the policies were small. Second, we weighted all our regressions (by the number of live births) because the RLMS survey sampled across states with equal probability, and thus the precision of the breast-feeding estimates varies by state.
12 Third, we report standard errors for all models that allow for an arbitrary correlation matrix within states (the so-called Huber-White sandwich estimator) because of changing sample sizes over time and the possibility of serially correlated errors within states.
REGRESSION RESULTS
The regression results for WIC participants are reported in Table 4 . We begin with the models of breast-feeding in the hospital, which are reported in columns 1 and 2; the models are identical except that Model 2 is augmented with the control variables discussed in the previous section. Recall that we expected the policies to affect breast-feeding in the hospital only if there were anticipatory effects. We found no support for there being anticipatory effects for the stringent welfare policies. Model 2 suggests a puzzling result in that one policy variable has a positive and significant coefficient ("work/moderate hours/ no sanctions"). This finding is hard to explain in the context of our conceptual framework and suggests that there may be an important omitted factor in our analysis. However, this estimate is small relative to the rate of breast-feeding in the hospital (see the dependent variable mean in the table). We return to the possibility that there may be an important omitted factor in the next subsection.
Turning to the analyses of breast-feeding six months after birth, the coefficients tell a consistent story and imply large impacts of work-related welfare requirements. Concentrating on the model that includes the controls (column 4), we note that the policy 11. Several studies have examined whether WIC rules affect breast-feeding behavior directly. To the extent that any such effects are constant over time, then our difference-in-difference estimation strategy should still identify the true impact of changes in welfare policy on breast-feeding. There were WIC policy changes that were intended to change directly the impact of WIC on breast-feeding behavior; however, these WIC policies were enacted before 1994 and thus should not be correlated with the welfare policy changes we analyzed. See Chatterji et al. (2002) and the citations therein about the various changes in the WIC policies.
12. Alan Ryan graciously provided the sample sizes by state for 1999, and from these data, it appears that the survey was based on a simple probability sample. However, because sample sizes were not available for all years, we could not use this information directly. coefficient that implies the largest effect is the one for the most stringent work requirements ("work/high hours/sanctions"). This coefficient implies that stringent work requirements reduce the prevalence of breast-feeding by 3.1 percentage points relative to the status quo of "no work/-/no sanctions." Given that the overall prevalence of breastfeeding is 14.0% among WIC mothers six months after birth, this proportion represents a reduction of approximately 22%. The two policies that have the next-largest effects are Notes: All models include state and year effects. Adjusted standard errors are in parentheses. The reference category is "no work/-/no sanctions." No state was categorized as "work/high hours/no sanctions." the policies that require work and are enforced by sanctions: "work/moderate hours/ sanctions" has a coefficient of -0.028, and "work/no hours/sanctions" has a coefficient of -0.023.
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The results for all mothers, presented in Table 5 , mirror those for WIC mothers. There is no support for the claim that the anticipation of binding work requirements several months after birth has an impact on breast-feeding rates in the hospital. For the results six months after birth, a consistent story emerges again. The policy coefficients imply that there is a large and significant reduction in breast-feeding in states that adopted the most stringent welfare policy; the decline in states that adopted the "work/high hours/sanctions" policies is 2.1 percentage points, and the decline in states that adopted the "work/ moderate hours/sanctions" policies is 1.7 percentage points.
When interpreting these magnitudes, note that breast-feeding is much more common among all new mothers than among WIC mothers, with rates of 23% and 14% six months after birth, respectively. Therefore, although the effects of strong work policies are only 1.0 percentage point higher for WIC mothers (3.1 percentage points) than for all mothers (2.1 percentage points), this difference translates into a much larger percentage change among WIC mothers: 22% (3.1/14.0) versus 9% (2.1/23.0).
The relative size of the effects for WIC mothers versus all mothers is consistent with their representation in the population. Specifically, we estimated that the effect of adopting the most stringent welfare policy amounts to a reduction in breast-feeding by 3.1 percentage points among WIC mothers (column 4 from Table 4 ) and supposed that the effect of the policy is zero among non-WIC mothers.
14 An analysis of the RLMS showed that roughly 45% of all new mothers are enrolled in WIC. Therefore, we would expect to find the effect among all new mothers to be roughly 45% of the size of the effect among WIC mothers. We found that the ratio of estimated effects is somewhat larger, at 68% (i.e., -0.021 relative to -0.031).
Sensitivity Analysis
As a check of the robustness of our results, we estimated an additional specification that controlled much more flexibly for differences across the states. In particular, the fixedeffects specification estimated thus far effectively controlled for any factors that are constant over time within a state and any factors that change systematically over time across all states. However, suppose that there were state-specific temporal changes that were correlated with changes in the laws. For example, it is possible that states that increasingly placed greater emphasis on breast-feeding or passed WIC polices to encourage breastfeeding also adopted less-stringent welfare reforms. Any such changes would confound our estimation strategy, given that we accounted only for fixed state and year effects.
To control more generally for secular changes within states, we estimated models that included the breast-feeding rate in the hospital as a control in regressions that used the sixmonth breast-feeding rate as the dependent variable. We interpreted the inclusion of the inhospital rate as controlling for any state-specific factors, such as other policy changes or public health initiatives, that generally affect the propensity of mothers to begin to breastfeed. Thus, including the in-hospital breast-feeding rate controls very flexibly for state-specific secular changes. However, such a strategy necessarily ignores any effects 13. The category "no work/-/sanctions" has a coefficient of -0.020; states that adopted these policies have an odd combination of tough sanctions policies but no work requirement for mothers with children six months old. Although 13 states implemented these policies at some point during the 1990s, only two states still had the policies in effect in 2000. Therefore, virtually all states implemented these policies for a short period. These complexities make it difficult to interpret the effects of this policy category.
14. We could not test this hypothesis because estimates of breast-feeding among mothers who were not enrolled in WIC are not available.
of the work policies on breast-feeding in the hospital (i.e., anticipatory effects), but our estimates in Tables 4 and 5 imply that these effects are negligible.
We present these estimates for WIC mothers in column 5 in Table 4 and for all mothers in column 5 in Table 5 . In both models, the effects of policy are essentially unchanged, and our basic finding still holds: stringent work requirements for new mothers reduce the prevalence of breast-feeding. Notes: All models include state and year effects. Adjusted standard errors are in parentheses. The reference category is "no work/-/no sanctions." No state was categorized as "work/high hours/no sanctions."
Welfare Reform and the National Breast-feeding Rate
The central question of interest is, to what extent did welfare reform cause reductions in the national breast-feeding rate? To provide a comprehensive answer to this question, we used the estimates of the effects of welfare work policies for all mothers six months after birth and computed what the prevalence of breast-feeding would have been if the welfare work requirements were not adopted. The change in breast-feeding caused by the change in policy between 1995 (before PRWORA) and 2000 (the most recent year of available data) is calculated as
The estimates of β 1 are reported in column 5 of Table 5 . Policy t is a vector of the proportion of live births in year t that are born under each of the policy regimes; these proportions were reported in the bottom panel of Table 3 . Eq. (2) implies that the national breast-feeding rate six months after birth was 1.2 percentage points lower in 2000 than it would have been if PRWORA work policies for new mothers had not been implemented. Prior to reforms in 1996, 21.6% of mothers breast-fed when their children were six months old (Table 1) . Therefore, welfare reform caused breast-feeding to decline by 5.5%.
Although the measured effect is moderate from an aggregate perspective, it implies that the policy impact was sizable, but plausible, among those mothers who were likely to be effected by the change. Sixty percent of live births in 2000 were in states that had adopted work requirements with strict sanctions (see Table 3 , last row). Forty-six percent of the infants in these states were enrolled in WIC, 15 and just prior to the reform, roughly 13% of the new WIC mothers breast-fed six months after birth (see Table 1 ). Using the 2000 Current Population Survey Food Security Supplement, we estimated that 73.5% of WIC female participants with children under age 1 do not work full time (i.e., at least 35 hours per week). Therefore, the share of live births in the nation who are at risk of being affected by the policy change is roughly 2.64% (i.e., 0.60 × 0.46 × 0.13 × 0.735). 16 With an estimated effect of 1.2 percentage points, this finding means that among new mothers who were breast-feeding, not working full time, and living in the states that adopted the strict sanction policies, roughly half (1.2/2.64) changed their breast-feeding practices because of the policies.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Previous research has suggested that employment can negatively affect the breastfeeding rate of women with infants. We examined whether the recent welfare reforms that require work by women with infants changed the prevalence of breast-feeding from 1990 to 2000. We found that these work requirements substantially and statistically significantly reduced breast-feeding. Our preferred estimates imply that for women on WIC, which is a group of new mothers who are at a substantial risk of entering welfare, the most stringent laws reduced breast-feeding by 22% relative to imposing no work requirements on new mothers. The second most stringent laws reduced breast-feeding by about 20% relative to imposing no work requirements. The estimates for all mothers, not 15. We calculated WIC participation among infants in states with full-family sanction policies using estimates of the number of live births from NCHS (2002) and the number of infants participating in WIC (Bartlett et al. 2002) in each state in 2000.
16. This calculation assumes that the proportion working full time does not differ between breast-feeding and non-breast-feeding women. If we assume that this difference is maximal (i.e., that 100% of breast-feeding women do not work full time), then the proportion at risk is slightly higher at 3.59% (0.60 × 0.46 × 0.13 × 1.0).
just those who participated in WIC, imply that if welfare reform had not been adopted, national breast-feeding rates six months after birth would have been 5.5% higher than they were in 2000.
These findings are particularly important given the substantial evidence of the benefits of breast-feeding for children and their mothers. However, the costs of the decrease in breast-feeding accrue not only to recipients and their children but also to society as a whole. Studies have shown that breast-feeding decreases health care costs and increases the productivity of working mothers through decreases in absenteeism at work (Montgomery and Splett 1997; Tuttle and Dewey 1996) . Because the women who are most at risk of being adversely affected by these policies are poor, it is possible that a greater financial burden will be placed on Medicaid.
There is political and popular support for policies that encourage welfare recipients to work, and these policies have been applied to mothers whose children are just a few months old. Our results suggest that these policies could impose a significant cost on infants and their mothers by reducing the prevalence of breast-feeding. This cost must be weighed against the potential benefits associated with the rise in employment. However, the vast majority of the harmful effects on breast-feeding would be eliminated if mothers of infants did not face the combined policies of full-family sanctions and work requirements of more than 18 hours per week-requirements that are currently in place in 28 states.
